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ABSTRACT
Environmental irresponsibility is one of the most prominent issues
confronting host communities of transnational corporations (TNCs)
engaged in the production of economic goods and, sometimes, services.
Drawing mainly on stakeholder theory, combined with legitimacy
theory, this article addresses how host communities in Africa combat
the challenge of environmental irresponsibility of TNCs. To illustrate the
dimensions and dynamics of the challenge, this paper examines the
experience of despoliation of Ogoniland by the oil giant Shell in Nigeria.
The analysis draws attention to the signiﬁcance of the role of individuals
and civil society groups in securing accountability of one of the most
formidable fronts of economic globalisation. The analysis is particularly
relevant to the experience of environmental irresponsibility in the
context of weak governance structures.
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Introduction
The activities of transnational corporations (TNCs) involved in oil exploration in Africa have had a
major impact on the environment, development and governance on the continent (Yusuf 2008,
Frynas 2010, Wettstein 2010). In the last one and a half decades, Nigeria has witnessed unprece-
dented levels of violence in its Niger Delta – the country’s main oil-producing area. The violence
has formed part of local responses to TNCs’ activities which have ostensibly been in compliance
with corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Idemudia and Ite 2006, Yusuf 2008, Ojakorotu 2009). The
intensity of violations of a variety of human rights by TNCs in the oil industry has been attested to
by a recent Nigerian government commissioned United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
assessment of Ogoniland, an oil-producing community in Nigeria (UNEP Report 2011). UNEP
stated, among others, that “the environmental restoration of Ogoniland could prove to be the
world’s most wide-ranging and long term oil clean-up exercise ever undertaken” (UNEP News
Centre 2011). It is relevant to note that Shell, the oil company that operated in the community,
has not only deﬁned what it conceives as its CSR obligations, but also maintained its adherence to
best practices (Lambooy et al. 2011) despite evidence to the contrary in the UNEP Report as well
as the clamour of local stakeholders.
Civil society groups play a cardinal role in contemporary conﬁgurations of global accountability
across a range of fronts: national, regional and international (Scholte 2011). Political independence
in former colonial territories and globalisation has opened up the space for civil society groups to
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take up protest against TNCs. This has been accentuated by the so called “third wave of democratisa-
tion” that has swept across many developing countries (Huntington 1991, Pretorius 2008). Conse-
quently, over time, there has been some global awareness of the debilitating impact of the
activities of TNCs in the developing world and various attempts at seeking redress against them.
In the speciﬁc context of extractive industries in Nigeria, Oshionebo has noted the signiﬁcance of
the activities of civil society groups to securing accountability of TNCs in the country’s considerably
lax regulatory environment (2007).
Drawing mainly on stakeholder theory combined with legitimacy theory, this article addresses
how host communities in Africa combat the challenge of environmental irresponsibility of TNCs.
The focus is on the operations of oil corporations in the context of countries with complicit
regimes alongside weak and corrupt governance structures. The experience of despoliation of Ogoni-
land by the oil giant Shell in Nigeria provides a good illustration of substantive challenges of the
context and is the focus in the discussion in this piece. The rest of the paper is structured as
follows: Section 2 sets out the theoretical framework of the analysis: the combination of the stake-
holder theory and legitimacy theory. Section 3 discusses the environmental irresponsibility of oil cor-
porations in Nigeria and the difﬁculty of securing justice in foreign and domestic contexts for such
conducts. The last section presents some lessons from the Nigerian experience of the efforts at com-
bating the environmental irresponsibility of TNCs.
Theoretical framework: stakeholder and legitimacy theories
In line with previous studies that combined stakeholder theory with other theories (Yang and Rivers
2009) or concepts (Logsdon and Palmer 1988, Mena et al. 2010) for analysing complex social
phenomena, this paper further adopts legitimacy theory to examine TNCs’ environmental irrespon-
sibility and how host communities in Africa attempt to combat it with speciﬁc reference to Ogoniland.
Stakeholder theory
In a very inﬂuential article, Donaldson and Preston (1995) have emphasised the dexterity of the sta-
keholder theory. They examined three interrelated but distinctive dimensions of the theory (descrip-
tive accuracy, instrumental power and normative validity) and concluded that, although these three
dimensions are supportive, the normative dimension constitutes the pivot as it is the only dimension
that is capable of explaining the link between stakeholder management and corporate performance.
The normative dimension holds that stakeholders are individuals or groups with “legitimate interests
in procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity” and the interests of these stakeholders
have “intrinsic value” (Donaldson and Preston 1995, p. 67). Logsdon and Palmer (1988) contended
that for corporations to be seen to be genuinely interested in enhancing their social performance
(as opposed to using CSR to further their parochial proﬁt maximisation objective), they must necess-
arily build their CSR activities on the stakeholder approach and strong ethical foundations. In a similar
vein, Wood (1991) articulated three fundamentals of social responsibility at the institutional (legiti-
macy), organisational (public responsibility) and individual (managerial discretion) levels within the
context of human and organisational behaviour. Furthermore, based on evidence from the literature,
Victor and Stephens discussed two theoretical (intellectual) bases of business ethics: the normative
philosophy and the descriptive social science (social psychology and organisation theory). They
argued that “to ignore the descriptive aspects of moral behaviour is to risk unreal philosophy”,
while ignoring the normative perspective “is to risk amoral social science”. On this account, any div-
ision between the two dimensions will exacerbate the current corporate debacle (1994, p. 145).
However, we align our arguments with the line of research that theorises that the stakeholder
theory is appropriate for aggregating and accommodating the interests of multiple sites of impact
of corporate activities. In this regard, Yang and Rivers (2009) adopted stakeholder and institutional
theories to explore the CSR activities of TNCs’ subsidiaries in terms of their internal and external
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pressures for legitimacy in their host communities, depending on the circumstances of their parent
companies. Also, based on the concepts of empowerment (of the poor, consumers and commu-
nities), dialogue and constructive engagement with stakeholders, Mena et al. (2010) investigated
ways by which corporations can improve their human right records.
The stakeholder framework provides strong support for a broad approach to TNC governance
mechanisms and accountability as it emphasises balancing the interests of TNCs’ shareholders, man-
agement and suppliers with the concerns of their external stakeholders including governments and
host communities. Furthermore, Sir Adrian Cadbury emphasised the need “to align as nearly as poss-
ible the interests of individuals, of corporations, and of society”. He noted further that the “the way
ahead” for the modern corporation “lies in ensuring that the fruits of good governance, its ability to
add value, are widely and wisely shared, thus playing a positive part in the goal of the developed and
developing world to alleviate poverty” (Cadbury 2003, p. vii).
Legitimacy theory
There are twomain forms in which legitimacy is discussed in political philosophy and legal theory; the
descriptive or sociological sense and normative or legal sense. The descriptive sense essentially exam-
ineswhether thosewho are the subject of the concernednorm, policy, institution or entity like the state
or an organisation consider it to be legitimate (Meyer and Sanklecha 2009, p. 2). Legitimacy in the nor-
mative sense considers whether the assumption underlying the descriptive sense of the concept is
correct by investigating whether it satisﬁes certain conditions or prescriptions (Meyer and Sanklecha
2009, p. 2). Hurd deﬁnes legitimacy as “the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution
ought to be obeyed” (1999, p. 381). This is similar to Suchman’s deﬁnition of legitimacy in the descrip-
tive or sociological sense, as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and
deﬁnitions” (1995, p. 574). This is the form of legitimacy in issue in the discussion that follows.
Legitimacy theory has been adopted in the literature to describe the responsiveness of corpor-
ations to local external stimuli by “implementing and developing voluntary social and environmental
disclosure of information in order to fulﬁll their social contract”, a contemporary necessity for their
“survival in jumpy and turbulent environment” (Burlea and Popa 2013, p. 1579). As a result, society’s
impression and perception of the organisation (with respect to social, moral and economic interests
of the local stakeholders) are taken with utmost seriousness when it reports its activities for fear of
being opposed or sanctioned by the local environment through boycott, social pressure or legislative
and judicial mechanisms. Over the years, the theory has gained popularity in social, environmental
and legal literature (see Dowling and Pfeffer 1975, Lindblom 1994, Gunningham et al. 2004,
Mobus 2005, Owen 2008, Meyer 2009, Tilling and Tilt 2010).
Combining stakeholder and legitimacy theories
In the context of explaining TNCs’ environmental irresponsibility in Africa, the stakeholder theory is
suitable for aggregating and accommodating the interests of multiple sites of impact of corporate
activities. Stakeholder theory provides a foundation for identifying the various groups and individuals
that are directly affected by the despoliation of the environment of host communities. This is particu-
larly relevant in the context of the activities of extractive corporations engaged in the exploitation of
natural resources such as oil and gas which are prone to, and have commonly been known, to impact
negatively on their host environment, especially in the context of lax regulatory mechanisms and
weak governance. Individuals and groups in host communities in such contexts are bound to be
keenly interested in abating the despoliation of their environment and seeking necessary redress.
These individuals and groups constitute a set of key stakeholders of TNCs (local stakeholders). Legiti-
macy theory explains how businesses such as TNCs must use their leverage responsibly in order to
prevent a situation in which local stakeholders feel compelled to exercise “their right” to “revoke”
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the continuation of the former’s business activities or continued existence within their environment.
Legitimacy theory can be linked to TNCs’ CSR in the host communities in an attempt to identify the
barriers host communities and stakeholders face in contending with the irresponsible behaviour of
TNCs.
TNCs and corporate irresponsibility in Africa: the Nigerian experience
Owing largely to institutional factors, the governance and regulation of TNCs are at their weakest in
the “resource-rich, but economically poor” African continent (Carmody 2011, p. 2). There is an impor-
tant historical side to this. The “scramble for Africa”, both old (by the West) and new (now mainly
joined by China and India, and to a lesser extent Japan and Indonesia), was and is principally for
access to natural resources (Carmody 2011). The dominance of TNCs on the continent dates back
to the colonial period (Adusei 2009), mostly from the sixteenth century with the likes of the British
East India Trading Company, the Royal Niger Company (later United African Trading Company)
and Lever Brothers (now Unilever), among others, established to engage in trade or territorial acqui-
sition in Africa, Asia and the Americas for their home countries (Greer and Singh 2000, Adusei 2009).
Others, especially those in the extractive industries prospecting for natural resources, most promi-
nently gold, diamonds, oil and coltan (a resource that is central to the global information technology
industry) (Carmody 2011), came on the scene mostly from the late nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries. These include corporations such as British Petroleum (BP), Exxon-Mobil and Shell (which is at the
centre of further discussions of TNC accountability in this article). The activities of TNCs especially in
the extractive industries in Africa proceeded without much scrutiny due to a number of factors, which
include the incidence of colonialism, poverty, political corruption,1 weak institutional structures and
the slow development of articulate and modern civil society groups on the continent.
The situation in Nigeria is typical of many former colonies commonly in the “developing countries”
socio-economic designation. After gaining independence from the UK, the country prioritised econ-
omic development as a measure for improving the quality of life of its citizens. Ironically, the drive to
achieve economic competitiveness by successive administrations has sometimes meant the adoption
of policies detrimental to public well-being. Such policies have in some cases not taken account of
“the health and well-being of its citizens or the protection of the environment”, resulting in
“human rights and environmental abuses by business corporations operating in Nigeria, including
transnational companies (TNCs)” (ICJ 2012, pp. 1–2).
However, in a slow but incremental manner, thewave of civil society activism ismaking inroads into
developing countries in Africa and elsewhere. The nascent development of awareness about thepower
of civil society groups and the articulation of “voices” of the weak and hitherto “voiceless” host com-
munities has manifested in various protests against perceived excesses and gross violations of
human rights by TNCs in Africa (Ikelegbe 2001, Okafor 2006) as elsewhere across the globe (Labunska
et al. 1999, Pendleton 2004, Simons 2004). In the Nigerian context, the weakness of the host commu-
nities derives from a number of factors including the historical factor earlier mentioned. Other factors
responsible for the silencingof the voices of dissent include long years of authoritarianmilitary rule, and
the “divide and rule” tactics of both the political elite and the oil companies who sometimes induce
community leaders (including traditional rulers) and pockets of restive youth groups, with gifts and
contracts. These factors engendered a social environment of internal mistrust, tenuous cooperation
and communal disagreements. The situation typically stymied efforts to present a united front
against the Nigerian state and the powerful TNCs involved in oil exploration in the Niger Delta even
where unity was important in presenting a common front to secure justice for the host communities.
As stated earlier, a major effect of TNCs’ activities in Africa is their impact on the environment,
development and governance, leading to an overarching concern about the implications for
human rights of host communities in the areas of their production operations. In the light of the
wide scope of their activities, there is now an expectation that TNCs will uphold human rights of
the people affected by their operations (McCorquodale 2009, Seppala 2009, Mena et al. 2010,
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Lambooy 2011, Preuss and Brown 2012, Fasterling and Demuijnck 2013). The situation supports a
human rights-based approach to the regulation of the activities of TNCs, but such a regime has
remained highly contested and inchoate till date in light of the non-state actor status of TNCs. The
approach has been constrained by the classic rationalisation in international law that human
rights instruments and the obligations arising from them are directed at states (Clapham 2006,
Deva 2012). There is also the position that there are multiple conceptions of what corporate respon-
sibility is or should be. The responsibility is ranged across a spectrum of accountability, from a strict
perspective to a laissez faire or market economy commitment (McCorquodale 2009, Yang and Rivers
2009, Baumann-Pauly and Scherer 2013).
Those who challenge the dominance of TNCs and advocate for their public accountability point at
their immense economic dominance. As Mathias Koenig-Archibugi has noted, such advocacy stems
from the fact that the “often huge economic clout” of corporations leads to their being “widely per-
ceived as capable of evading public control and getting away with behaviour that harms employees,
consumers, vulnerable communities or the environment” (Koenig-Archibugi 2004, p. 235). Added to
these, there are increasing pressures for more openness and accountability among TNCs. As Eweje
observed, “corporations are constantly under pressure to be more open and accountable for a
wide range of actions and to report publicly on their performance in the social and environmental
arenas” (Eweje 2006, p. 95).
The next part of the discussion focuses on the recourse to litigation by individuals and groups in
the context of state failure to regulate TNCs in the oil industry in Nigeria as a result of a number of
factors, including corruption among the political elite and lack of political will (Omotola 2007,
Odoeme 2013, pp. 742–744).
The difﬁculty of securing justice in foreign and domestic contexts
The historical context highlighted above is signiﬁcant for understanding the persisting pattern of gross
violations of human rights by TNCs on the continent and in other developing countries which almost
invariably have a colonial legacy. It is also a major reason for the focus on Shell and Ogoniland in this
article. A focus on Ogoniland is apt for, among others, it was the site – at least at some point – for the
production of about half of Nigeria’s oil output (Falola and Genova 2005, p. 128). It is also a poster child
for how the activities of TNCs in a lax regulatory environment can result in disaster for host communities
and eventually, TNCs. Both elements have some pedigree in the Nigerian experience. Shell has a pre-
eminent position in the country’s oil industry due mainly to the fact of British colonial relationship with
the country. As Justice Akenhead recently observed in Bodo Community and Others v Shell Petroleum
Development Company (Bodo v SPDC),2 “Shell from the start was and continues to be the single most
dominant of the independent oil companies who have exploited the oil resources of Nigeria, much
of it in the Niger delta area.”3 Indeed, the company is noted for usually being the sole operator of
joint ventures for oil exploration involving other transnational oil companies operating in the
country like Total Oil Exploration and Production Company, Agip Oil Company as well as the country’s
national oil corporation, the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation.
Oil exploration as a commercial activity was facilitated by colonial legislation in Nigeria dating
back to the statute which sought to grant exclusive licence to British ﬁrms in the country. While
the search for oil started in the country in 1903, following the amalgamation of the Northern and
Southern protectorates in 1914, the British government promulgated the Mineral Oils Ordinance
No. 17 of 1914. This piece of legislation granted a monopoly over Nigeria’s mineral resources includ-
ing oil, to British citizens and ﬁrms (Omeje 2006, p. 215, Steyn 2009, p. 251). In this regard, Section 6
(1) of the legislation provided that:
No lease or license shall be granted except to a British subject or to a British company registered in Great Britain or
in a British colony and having its principal place of business within her majesty’s dominion, the chairman and
managing director (if any) and the majority of the directors of which are British subjects.
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As mentioned earlier, the historical dimension is critical to understanding the debacle in Ogoniland
and by extension, the Niger Delta as a whole. The search for oil in Nigeria commenced under the aus-
pices of colonial government which had a vested interest in maintaining a monopoly over the indus-
try for securing not only commercial, but also military interests (Steyn 2009). The Mineral Oils
Ordinance paved the way for oil prospecting by Shell/D’Arcy which started its oil exploration activities
in the country in 1937 with a licence covering the whole country. A joint venture between Shell and
BP (but operated by Shell) was the ﬁrst to discover oil in commercial quantity in Oloibiri in January
1956 (Omeje 2006, p. 214, Falola and Heaton 2008, p. 181, Steyn 2009, p. 266). Despite considerable
local opposition to and political mobilisation against the operation of the oil corporation in parts of
the country, Shell was able to continue its exploration activities with ﬁnancial, legislative and security
backing from the colonial government. As Steyn noted, while the amended Mineral Oils Ordinance
stated that all land was vested in the Crown and provided for the prosecution and jailing of those
who interfered with oil exploration, it also excluded any need for Shell to engage with the host com-
munities of its exploration activities (Steyn 2009, pp. 262–263). This legislative and political arrange-
ment has persisted in Nigeria’s oil exploration environment with the attitude of the ruling elite,
closely tracking that of the erstwhile colonial government.
Ogoniland is an area of about 1000 km2 situated in the Rivers State of Nigeria and located in the
Niger Delta. The Niger Delta is regarded as “one of the 10 most important wetland and coastal marine
ecosystems in the world” with extensive oil deposits (Amnesty International 2009, p. 9). Oil has been
the major income earner for Nigeria for more than four decades. The main occupation of the over
eight hundred thousand people of the oil-rich community is farming and ﬁshing. However, Ogoni-
land has suffered numerous incidents of oil spillage and oil well ﬁres over the past decades (UNEP
Report 2011, pp. 22–24).
Ogoniland presents an egregious example of environmental degradation. There was relatively
high media coverage of the 2010 BP Gulf of Mexico spill in the USA, which was no doubt a major
case of environmental pollution with serious implications for local communities in the area.
However, a much less publicised but, by far, worse experience of environmental degradation has
been ongoing in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria for over four decades as exempliﬁed by the experi-
ence of Ogoniland. The situation has led to uprisings and loss of lives and properties within the region
particularly from 1999 till date following the political transition from military to civil rule in the
country. The assessment conducted by UNEP (mentioned earlier) conﬁrmed that the level of environ-
mental damage resulting from Shell’s oil exploration activities in Ogoniland was severe and virtually
unparalleled elsewhere. According to the report, the soil as well as groundwater has suffered deleter-
ious effects of oil contamination. Its conclusion states, in part, that:
pollution of soil by petroleum hydrocarbons in Ogoniland is extensive in land areas, sediments and swampland.
Most of the contamination is from crude oil although contamination by reﬁned products is also found at three
locations.
In effect, neither farmers nor ﬁshermen (and women) could earn their living in the community,
thereby pauperising a vast majority of the population. Rather than promoting social well-being
and development, oil exploration in Ogoniland (and other parts of the Niger Delta) has brought
tears and sorrow, environmental degradation, ecological disaster, poverty and disease (Idemudia
2009, p. 318, UNEP 2011).
The level of environmental degradation and violations of human rights resulting from the explora-
tion of oil in Ogoniland moved the community to protest and demand compensation for the despo-
liation. The peaceful protests of the Ogoni community were mobilised under the banner of the
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) led by the famous author and human rights
activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. The protests forced Shell to stop further exploration activities in Ogoniland
in 1993. Accounts of what followed have become well known and it sufﬁces to provide only a
very brief recap here.4 The main response of the government was the militarisation of Ogoniland
and the killing of unarmed protesters (Yusuf 2008, pp. 83–85, Idemudia 2009, pp. 318–319). It is
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alleged that Shell took an active role in the brutal repression of local protesters by Nigeria’s military
rulers in the 1990s. Shell was also implicated in the 1995 trial, conviction and execution of the “Ogoni
Nine”5 in breach of due process.
The trajectory of the cases emanating from the experiences of host communities with transna-
tional oil corporations in the Niger Delta closely connects with Koenig-Archibugi’s views (2004) on
concerns about public accountability of TNCs. The Ogoni people in the course of their struggle to
rein in the power of the oil giant Shell found that the Alien Torts Statute (ATS) has been useful as
a mechanism for securing accountability of TNCs originating from, or with operations in the USA.
From 1996, a series of cases was instituted by relatives of the Ogoni 9, under the ATS against Shell
in the USA. The ATS provides that any district court of the USA “shall have original jurisdiction on
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States”.6 The agitations of the Ogoni, thanks to the efforts of local political activists,
had come to the attention of others not only in the USA especially, but also in Europe (Falola and
Genova 2005, pp. 127–129, Falola and Heaton 2008, p. 238). With the support of the Centre for Con-
stitutional Rights (CCR), Earth Rights International (ERI) and a number of other human rights attor-
neys, the cases were instituted by the petitioners “to hold Shell accountable for human rights
violations in Nigeria, including summary execution, crimes against humanity, torture, inhuman treat-
ment and arbitrary arrest and detention” (CCR 2009; see also Amnesty International 2009, p. 4). Three
of those cases, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Wiwa v. SPDC and Wiwa v. Anderson (Wiwa v Shell) are
of interest in this discussion as they involve the group referred to here as the “Ogoni 10” which
includes Ken Saro-Wiwa’s son.7
On 8 June 2009, Shell announced a settlement in lieu of the Ogoni 10 withdrawing their claims.
Shell agreed with the petitioners to pay them US$15.5 m (£9.7 m) but did not admit any liability
on the claims. Rather, Shell described the settlement as a “humanitarian gesture … a compassionate
payment to the petitioners and the estates they represent in recognition of the tragic turn of events
in Ogoniland”, emphasising further that “Shell had no part in the violence that took place” (Shell
Global 2009). The settlement was also to cover the petitioners’ litigation costs (including counsel’s
fees) with part also to be devoted to the establishment of a trust fund for the Ogoni community
at the request of the petitioners. However, the larger dispute between the Ogoni people and Shell
remains as the Ogoni 10 and their attorneys made clear they were not speaking for the Ogoni
people (Center for Constitutional Rights 2009).
As a result of the agitations and campaigns by human rights groups, environmentalists and the
press, the Dutch Parliament resolved to hold a public hearing on the operations of its oil giant,
Shell, in January 2011. At the hearing, it emerged that Shell was not willing to provide a response
to how it was utilising its “bargaining power” in its high-level contacts with Nigerian politicians
and authorities to encourage sustainable development and curb corruption (Lambooy et al. 2011,
pp. 25–26). Shell insisted that such disclosure will harm its business interests. It also admitted delay-
ing or refusing to obey Nigerian courts’ decisions or ﬁnes emanating from them because these were
“unfair” (Lambooy et al. 2011, pp. 25–26).
As discussed above, the ATS appears to be a promising legislation for challenging the virtually
overwhelming power of TNCs in the jurisdiction from which the largest number of TNCs, particularly
oil corporations, originate. However, the corporations seem to have struck back, halting the moves
towards ﬁrmly holding them accountable. Speciﬁcally, the 2013 decision in Kiobel et al. v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co. et al. (Shell)8 has now severely limited opportunities for relying on it to secure
justice against TNCs (Wuerth 2013, p. 604). Kiobel was instituted in 2002 by 12 Ogoni victims/relatives
led by a widow of one of the Ogoni Nine. The crux of the case for the petitioners (now residing in the
USA after securing political asylum as legal residents) is that Shell (its Dutch, British holding compa-
nies and joint Nigerian subsidiary, in concert and individually) aided and abetted the Nigerian gov-
ernment in committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria to wit: extrajudicial killings; crimes
against humanity; torture and cruel treatment; arbitrary arrest and detention; violations of the right to
life, liberty, security and association; forced exile and destruction of property. The District Court
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dismissed some of the claims leaving only those regarding crimes against humanity, torture and cruel
treatment, arbitrary arrest and detention. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the Second Circuit dis-
missed all the complaints of the petitioners on the basis that the law of nations does not recognise
corporate liability. The case ﬁnally ended up on further appeal to the US Supreme Court.
The US Supreme Court, after hearing oral arguments from the parties, then framed an additional
question for them to address it on: “whether and under what circumstances courts may recognize a
cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the
territory of a sovereign other than the United States”. It was the US Supreme Court’s decision on this
question that appears to have closed the window of opportunity previously afforded disempowered
petitioners like the Ogonis to seek justice in the USA against powerful TNCs. Upholding the Court of
Appeal’s decision, the US Supreme Court held that there is a presumption against the extra-territorial
application of the ATS unless the facts “touches and concerns” the USA with “sufﬁcient force”. It held
that in this case, the parties and relevant conduct complained about lack sufﬁcient ties to the USA for
the ATS to confer jurisdiction on a court in that country. It stated that entertaining the claims of the
petitioners would amount to a violation of the international law principle of sovereignty. It is instruc-
tive to note, however, that despite agreeing with the judgment of the court, Justice Breyer made the
critical point in his concurring judgment that the ATS “was enacted with ‘foreign matters’ in mind. The
statute’s text refers explicitly to ‘alien[s],’ ‘treaties and the law of nations’”. Justice Breyer further
stated, quite rightly, that many countries allow plaintiffs to bring actions against their own nationals
based on unlawful conduct that took place abroad.
Before the public hearing in the Dutch Parliament (in 2011) mentioned earlier, four Nigerian
farmers and ﬁshermen from three different villages located in three different states in the Niger
Delta region had sued Shell in courts of the Netherlands way back in 2008. The claims were for oil
spills that occurred in 2004, 2005 and 2007. One of the plaintiffs, not surprisingly, was from Ogoni-
land. As was the case in the USA, the plaintiffs were supported by civil society groups involved in
environmental protection and especially the Amsterdam-based Vereniging Milieudefensie (Friends
of the Earth Netherlands), a Dutch organisation established with the objective of worldwide pro-
motion of environmental care. Milieudefensie joined as a co-plaintiff in each of the cases.
Two cases involving Ogoniland were instituted by Barizaa Dooh, a farmer and ﬁsherman in Goi
village, Ogoniland,9 and Milieudefensie in Dooh & Milieudefensie v Royal Dutch Shell, & SPDC10
before the District Court of The Hague. The consolidated proceedings were in respect of an oil
spill from the underground oil pipeline of SPDC (Royal Dutch Shell’s wholly owned subsidiary)
near the village of Goi on 10 October 2004. The leak was from an almost 46-cm long narrow
opening in the steel pipeline wall which was provisionally closed on 12 October 2004. Shortly
after the spill, an oil ﬁre also occurred near Goi. A Joint Investigation Team (JIT) – which comprised
SPDC representatives, Nigerian government agencies and the nearby village of Mogho – investigated
the oil spill on 12 and 13 October 2004. The JIT report stated that an estimated 150 barrels of oil had
spilled from the oil pipeline near Goi and that it was due to sabotage. The SPDC and government
representatives signed the report but the community representatives did not. On 8 December
2004, the state government (Rivers State) issued a notice barring SPDC from carrying out all the
scheduled clean-up work due to oil spills in Ogoniland until further notice. After a period of nego-
tiations from November 2006 to August 2007 – reportedly at the expense of SPDC – a group of 27
Nigerian contractors performed the remediation work in the vicinity of Goi.
The plaintiffs led evidence to challenge the claim that the spill was caused by sabotage as claimed
in the JIT report. They also sought a declaration that Royal Dutch Shell and SPDC carry out remedia-
tion that was in line with international standards as the previous one was inadequate. They further
sought a declaration that SPDC had committed a tort against Dooh as a result of the oil spill and
demanded compensation. The crux of the case for the plaintiffs was that SPDC failed to comply
with its duty of care to produce oil in a careful manner and prevent oil spills from occurring. This
duty of care also exists in areas over which SPDC has no control, such as Ogoniland.11 In addition,
SPDC failed to adequately respond to the oil spill. As a result, SPDC was liable under Nigerian law
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for negligence, nuisance or trespass to the property of the plaintiffs. As to the justiﬁcation for includ-
ing the Royal Dutch Shell in the case, the plaintiffs contended that the parent companies of SPDC
failed to comply with their duty to induce the latter to prevent this oil spill near Goi in 2004, to ade-
quately respond to it and to adequately clean up the oil pollution. Royal Dutch Shell was also obliged
to ensure that SPDC had sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources and technical expertise to adequately perform
these activities. In addition, Royal Dutch Shell failed in not issuing SPDC guidelines on best practices
and ensuring compliance with them. According to the plaintiffs, the parent companies Royal Dutch
Shell, Shell Petroleum and Shell T&T were aware of the problematic situation of oil spills in Nigeria and
that, in many respects, they interfered with, and exercised inﬂuence on, SPDC’s activities in Nigeria
from The Hague and London. Shell denied any wrongdoing and also maintained that, following a
2005 reorganisation, Royal Dutch Shell and the other two parent companies could not be held
liable for the activities of Shell Development Company, the Nigerian subsidiary.
In its judgment delivered on 30 January 2013, the District Court of The Hague, contrary to the
objection of Royal Dutch Shell and SPDC, determined that, at the procedural level, it had jurisdiction
to hear the cases. It reasoned that the claims against both companies have the same legal basis. Even
more importantly, it noted there has been an international trend to hold parent companies of
multinationals liable in their own country for the harmful practices of foreign (sub-)subsidiaries, in
proceedings which the foreign (sub-)subsidiary involved was also joined as a party. As far as the
District Court was concerned, “the forum non conveniens restriction no longer plays any role in
today’s international private law”.
However, the District Court dismissed all the substantive claims of the plaintiffs. It held that under
Nigerian law, the parent companies in The Hague and London did not commit any tort of negligence
and could not be held liable for the (in)actions of their subsidiary. Among others, the District stated
that it came to this conclusion because the businesses of the parent companies and SPDC are not
essentially the same; the parent companies formulate general policy lines from The Hague and/or
London and are involved in worldwide strategy and risk management. SPDC, it stated, is involved
in the production of oil in Nigeria. It would be unreasonable to ﬁx a duty of care on a parent
company of an international group of oil companies in respect of the people living in the vicinity
of oil pipelines and oil facilities of (sub-)subsidiaries. This according to the District Court would
create a duty of care in respect of a virtually unlimited group of people in many countries. The
Court also held that the spill was caused by sabotage, so SPDC was not liable either under the
Nigerian Oil Pipelines Act.
By far the most indicative instance of the growing awareness of the adoption of external judicial
means to seek justice for environmental despoliation in the Niger Delta is the more recent case of
Bodo v SPDC referred to above. The landmark case commenced in the UK in 2011 and involved
over 15,000 claimants from Bodo community, Ogoniland. It involved several representative-type clai-
mants including claims on behalf of children. The claimants sued Shell in the High Court of England
and Wales, for massive crude oil spills said to have occurred in 2008 and 2009 due to alleged equip-
ment failure. Despite notice of the spills to Shell, the corporation did not take any action to remedy
the situation. The oil spills, according to the claimants, severely impacted Bodo Creek covering an
area of 9230 ha, devastating marine life with the mangroves in the area largely destroyed. The
damage includes high levels of hydrocarbons in water, sediment and tissue samples which exceed
both Nigerian and international legal standards for hydrocarbons contamination rates by a signiﬁcant
margin. They also called in aid, the UNEP Report mentioned earlier. The claimants sought damages at
common law and statutory compensation under Nigerian law. A JIT report stated that the spills were
indeed due to equipment failure. Shell reportedly offered £4000 (four thousand pounds sterling) for
the damage.
On 3 August 2011, Shell publicly admitted liability a little over four months after the case was insti-
tuted, stating the corporation would settle the claims out of court under Nigerian law. But that settle-
ment was not to come until January 2015. Shell offered the sum of $83 million to be shared by the
over 15,000 claimants affected by the spills and the community. Shell stated it was committed to
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cleaning up Bodo and surrounding areas affected by the spills which the corporation claimed was
hitherto delayed by the division within the community.
A major point of interest regarding the foregoing cases is the challenge posed by the attempt to
secure accountability of Shell for its activities in Ogoniland and the wider Niger Delta by local stake-
holders. This challenge remains a continuing issue for both the state and society in Nigeria. It is note-
worthy that Shell had made strenuous efforts to have the cases dismissed through various motions
and appeals including advertence, in each of the cases to the doctrine of forum non-conveniens.
Forum non-conveniens has been rightly described as a “a judicial doctrine that allows a trial judge
to dismiss a case, even though parties have met jurisdictional and venue requirements, when trial
in another forum is more convenient and just” (Ismail 1991, p. 249). In these cases, Shell argued in
various forms, but basically to the same issue, that the convenient forum for the litigation was
Nigeria, not the USA or the Netherlands as the case may be. The beneﬁt of hindsight suggests this
is a well-considered ploy to evade accountability. TNCs are aware that despite widespread abuses,
litigation against them remains rare in host state jurisdictions to which they are referred. A
number of factors, which can be summed up as weak institutional arrangements, are responsible
for the situation. Inadequacies of substantive and procedural legislation for litigation, weak judicial
remedies, corruption in the legal system, near-absence of pro-bono legal services and the absence
of legal aid (Ismail 1991, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre 2012, Omoteso and Mobolaji
2014) combine to limit the prospects of legal action against TNCs in many host states in the devel-
oping world. TNCs, being prominent and well-informed operators in that environment, are aware and
take advantage of these factors to undermine efforts at securing their accountability.
Paradoxically, in instances where the institutions of the state have moved against TNCs to secure
accountability, the latter have resisted and denounced those moves by questioning their credibility.
TNCs have adopted an attitude of calling into question the legitimacy of regulatory and accountabil-
ity measures instituted against them by declaring concerned organs of government such as courts
and parliament corrupt, and then neglecting or refusing to comply with their decisions. In this
regard, it is relevant to note that the UNEP Report has rightly noted that the long-standing nature
of environmental problems occasioned by frequent oil spills accords a “prominent role” to the Niger-
ian judiciary in dealing with emergent claims for compensation and even punishment of “oil-related
offences and crimes” (UNEP Report 2011, p. 36). In practice, however, claims for compensation and/or
even trials for oil-related offences have been so few and unrepresentative of the severity of the pro-
blems arising from oil exploration activities in the Niger Delta. Even in the few cases where the judi-
ciary has been enlisted for accountability, the oil corporations have denounced such interventions. A
good example is Shell’s failure to stop gas ﬂaring in the Niger Delta as ordered by a Nigerian court
(Haritz 2011) in Jonah Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria and 2 Others
(Gbemre).12 The applicants had brought the action on the grounds that gas ﬂaring by Shell in their
community has led to the release of toxins that poison and pollute the environment. The toxins nega-
tively impact the health, lives and livelihood of the people, including the destruction of their farm-
lands and crops. The petitioners further contended that members of the community were
exposed to higher risks of premature death, respiratory diseases, painful breathing, chronic bronchi-
tis, decreased lung functions, asthma and even cancer. The community was successful in its case for
an injunction to halt the ﬂaring and a declaration that it was illegal. Shell, however, failed to meet the
terms of the judgment which required it to phase out the ﬂaring (Friends of the Earth 2007). It insisted
the court did not follow proper procedure in deciding the case and appealed the decision (Black
2013). Symptomatic of the institutional deﬁciencies mentioned earlier, the appeal has not proceeded
to substantive hearing or judgment, more than eight years on. Nothing has come of the case except
that the High Court judge who heard it was stopped from hearing contempt charges against Shell for
non-compliance with the judgment and transferred from the jurisdiction. Shell has been noted for
perfecting the art of denying any wrongdoing, delaying and ultimately derailing already fragile judi-
cial processes in developing countries in various bids to avoid liability (Kaufman 2010). In 2010 for
instance, Shell immediately appealed a decision requiring it to pay compensation for oil spills in
10 H. O. YUSUF AND K. OMOTESO
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
an
ch
es
ter
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
8:0
8 0
7 J
an
ua
ry
 20
16
 
an area of its operation, stating that soldiers had caused the leak at a time it was not operating in the
area during the Nigerian civil war, over four decades earlier (see Nwachukwu 2010).
Given the dynamics described above, proceeding against TNCs within the current legal regime is
an immensely frustrating experience for victims in their host communities in developing countries.
The inequality of arms, as between the economically and socially disadvantaged victims from
usually remote parts of developing or (even underdeveloped) countries against a TNC, is simply
unconscionable. Consider, for example, the experience of the Ogoni 10 mentioned earlier. Following
the settlement of the claims by Royal Dutch/Shell inWiwa v Shell, the petitioners in their public state-
ment referred to this harrowing aspect of their struggle:
Justice in these cases is not a level playing ﬁeld – the odds are stacked in favour of the corporations and this case
highlights the need to level the legal playing ﬁeld in issues like access to justice as well as the regime of rights and
responsibilities that govern the global economy. (CCR 2009)
The cases of the Nigerian ﬁshermen and farmers commenced in 2008 and Shell adopted various
tactics that led to considerable delay of the proceedings. These included refusal to produce docu-
ments allegedly in its possession which could substantiate the claims of the plaintiffs, challenging
the jurisdiction of the courts in all three cases, objection to continuation of one of the cases on
the basis that there was another case pending in Nigeria of similar purport, objection to Milieudefen-
sie being party to the case and so on. Shell lost virtually every ancillary application it brought in this
regard, but its tactics ensured that judgment was only delivered in 2013. Dooh, the Ogoni plaintiff,
had meanwhile died in the course of the case and was substituted by his heirs. Even the claimants
in Bodo v Shell, considered a landmark case against Shell in many respects, suffered the same fate.
While the case was the ﬁrst to have proceeded to hearing before Shell settled (in Ogoni 10 Shell
settled the plaintiffs in lieu of a hearing of the claims on the eve of the hearing), the claimants did
not secure the settlement until seven years after the incident. Many other individuals and commu-
nities have remained in waiting for justice for Shell and other TNCs’ environmental irresponsibility
in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa.
Conclusion
Oil prospecting proceeded with active support of the colonial government for British ﬁrms with vir-
tually no consultation with the people and communities where exploration was carried out. Local
opposition to oil exploration activities was sometimes violently repressed. Successive Nigerian gov-
ernments soon after independence in 1960 – predominantly military regimes from 1966 through to
1999 – took up the gauntlet where the British colonial governments left off. They applied mainly the
same or similar legislation on and political tactics in the governance of the oil extraction regime. The
situation was made worse for oil-producing communities by the fact that oil had quickly become the
country’s main foreign exchange earner with the central government keen to ensure a smooth ﬂow
of oil money into its coffers. Any opposition to the activities of the TNCs involved in oil exploration
was deemed subversive to national economic interests. Nevertheless, the environmental problems
arising from the operations of international oil companies in the Niger Delta remain a major challenge
in the country.
Following the path of previous relevant studies that combined stakeholder theory with other the-
ories or concepts (Logsdon and Palmer 1988, Yang and Rivers 2009, Mena et al. 2010), this study com-
bined stakeholder theory with legitimacy theory to assess TNCs’ environmental irresponsibility and
how host communities in Africa attempt to combat it. It ﬁnds that host communities, as TNCs’ key
stakeholders, do not perceive the operations of TNCs as desirable or appropriate, thereby putting
their sociological legitimacy to question. They hold the impression that TNCs care less about the
social well-being and economic interests of the local stakeholders and this has led to bitter opposi-
tion, social unrest and litigations instituted by the local stakeholders. Worse still, despite the
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agitations of these local stakeholders (as individuals and groups), the responsiveness of TNCs to ful-
ﬁlling their “social contract” with their host communities remains grossly unsatisfactory.
From the perspective of legitimacy theory, many, if not most, TNCs have failed to use their lever-
age responsibly and local stakeholders have felt the need to exercise “their right” to “revoke” the con-
tinuation of the TNCs’ (Shell’s, to be particular) business activities or continued existence within their
environment. Ironically too, TNCs involved in oil exploration activities such as Shell have in turn ques-
tioned the legitimacy of a number of measures designed to secure their accountability for harm
occurring in the course of their operations. The outcomes of the agitations of various individuals
and groups to secure justice against the powerful oil corporations operating in the Niger Delta
may appear to be marginal. Still, it is relevant that the efforts of the Ogoni and the Niger Delta
environmental advocacy groups as key stakeholder groups forced Shell to suspend its oil exploration
activities in Ogoniland since 1993. Shell decided to pull out of the area completely in 2013.
Even powerful global actors sometimes backed by normative legitimacy may ﬁnd that the need
for securing sociological legitimacy almost ranks quite close, if not at par, with the relevance of nor-
mative legitimacy. Shell’s normative legitimacy steeped in historical advantage and decades of oper-
ations did eventually give way in the face of local opposition to its perceived irresponsible conduct
with regard to its environmental practices. This is an important issue for TNCs whose immense clout,
though clearly not in doubt, requires they secure legitimacy with their local host communities,
especially in the context of extractive commercial engagements. Shell’s experience in Ogoniland
brings to the fore the signiﬁcance of the role of sociological legitimacy. While it was (and remains)
backed by normative legitimacy in its overall operations in Nigeria, its deﬁcient sociological legiti-
macy led to its ceasing operations in Ogoniland with continuing repercussions more than a
decade on.
While they have been largely failed by the governments and state institutions including the judi-
ciary of their countries, the efforts of local communities (as key stakeholders operating as individuals
or groups) at securing justice against TNCs are gradually yielding results. Despite the fact that only
one of the cases against Shell in the Netherlands succeeded,13 the involvement of farmers from
other parts of the Niger Delta in those cases is noteworthy. The cases constitute an interesting mile-
stone in the efforts of victims in the region to secure a remedy against the oil giant outside Nigeria’s
shores; a sign of the expanding recourse to this strategy across the Niger Delta. Such efforts have
attracted the interests of international bodies and environmental rights groups who have accorded
the local stakeholders substantial moral and legal support necessary to draw the attention of the
world to their plight. This, in turn, is beginning to hold the oppressive hands of TNCs and making
them pay for their environmental atrocities, notwithstanding TNCs’ drive to escape justice by exploit-
ing “legal forms” – the letters of the law– rather than its spirit.
Notes
1. Involvement in high-level corruption and ﬁnancial malpractices has been a major issue of concern regarding the
activities of TNCs around the world and with particular reference to their activities in developing world. A most
recent report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows commissioned by the African Union/United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (AU/ECA) Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic
Development presents details of how the continent remains “a net creditor to the rest of the world” losing over
$50 billion. See UNECA (2015). A major source of the illicit ﬁnancial ﬂows is the ﬁnancial malpractices of TNCs.
The report states that TNCs operating in Africa engage, among others, in over-invoicing of imports and under-invoi-
cing of exports, particularly in the natural resources sector, easily the largest economic sector in Africa; mis-invoicing
of services and intangibles such as fees for intellectual property, professional services and intra-group loans; unequal
contracts; and secret contracts with the collusion of national elites to evade tax. To cite just one example, the report
found that in 2008, a TNC was granted a mining concession for an ore mine in Guinea that has the potential to gen-
erate revenues of about $140 billion within a period of 20 years for only $165million. A new government terminated
the concession on several grounds including allegations of corruption “following the discovery that ‘half of the
rights to the concession had been sold to another multinational for $2.5 billion’” (UNECA 2015, p. 31). The report
is available at: http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/ﬁles/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf
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2. [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC).
3. Bodo v Shell, para. 5.
4. It was for instance an important part of the Communication to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights
(2001).
5. Ken Saro-Wiwa, John Kpuinen, Dr Barinem Kiobel, Saturday Doobee, Nordu Eawo, Daniel Gbokoo, Paul Levera, Felix
Nuate and Baribor Berain.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
7. Lucky Doobee, Monday Gbokoo, David Kiobel, Karalolo Kogbara, Blessing Kpuinen, James N-nah, Friday Nuate, Ken
Saro-Wiwa Jr, Michael Vizor and Owens Wiwa.
8. No. 10-1491.
9. Barizaa Dooh actually died on 12 January 2012 before the case was concluded and judgment delivered on the cases
in 2013.
10. Two separate cases later consolidated and heard together: Barizaa Manson Tete Dooh and Vereniging Milieudefensie v
Royal Shell Dutch PLC & Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd C/09/337058/HA ZA 09-1581; Barizaa
Manson Tete Dooh and Vereniging Milieudefensie v Shell Petroleum N.V. & The Shell Transport and Trading Company Ltd
C/09/365482 HA ZA 10-1665 4 30 (January 2013).
11. It is important to note in this regard that while Shell stopped oil prospecting in Ogoniland, its operations there con-
tinued in many respects like the fact of its underground pipelines which still actively transported oil to other parts of
the country, one of which was in issue in this case. It also had several oil well-heads in Ogoniland that have not been
demobilised there.
12. Mr Jonah Gbemre (for himself and representing Iwherekan Community in Delta State, Nigeria) v Shell Petroleum Devel-
opment Company Nigeria Ltd, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and Attorney-General of the Federation Suit
FHC/B/CS/53/0, AHRLR 151 (NgHC 2005).
13. Incidentally, this was one that involved another part of the Niger Delta and not Ogoniland.
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